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DR. MILES’S ORPHANS: VERTICAL CONSPIRACY AND
CONSIGNMENT IN THE WAKE OF LEEGIN
Jeffrey L. Harrison*

INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court overturns a well-established case, the
impact extends well beyond that ruling. Cases that have survived
for extended periods of time typically spawn complementary cases.
These complementary cases protect the ruling in the principal case
from erosion by the imagination of business planners, lawyers,
scholars, and judges. Or, these complementary cases may be the
cases that narrow the rule in the principal case when the Court
wants to temper the effect of—but not overrule—its prior decision.
When the principal case is, however, overturned, both of these types
of cases become orphans. Without the parent case, it is not clear
what the complementary cases stand for.
This scenario is currently playing out in the field of antitrust.
In 2007 the Supreme Court took a step many thought overdue and
many more expected. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
1
PSKS, Inc. overturned a nearly hundred-year-old case, Dr. Miles
2
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co. In Dr. Miles, the Court
established that resale price maintenance (“RPM”) was a per se
3
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Post-Leegin, RPM may
still violate the Sherman Act, but only after a plaintiff prevails
under the more difficult and economically meaningful “rule of
4
reason” standard. Since Leegin, there has been a great deal of
* Stephen C. O’Connell Chair and Professor of Law, University of
Florida.
1. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
2. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
3. Id. at 408 (“[A]greements or combinations between dealings, having for
their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are
injurious to the public interest and void.”). Section 1 of the Sherman Act
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
4. In brief, under the per se standard, a practice is unlawful without
further inquiry if it can be shown that the parties engaged in the practice. See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th ed. 2009). Under the rule of reason, the
plaintiff must also demonstrate that the practice had an anticompetitive effect.
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006). In actuality, the rule of reason does
not represent a single standard; there may be varying degrees of proof
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activity as legislation is produced at both the state and federal level
to effectively overrule its holding and declare as a legislative matter
5
that RPM is per se unlawful. And, as one would expect, there has
6
also been a great deal of scholarly commentary. To some extent,
the level of commentary about Leegin is surprising because the
Court had already taken a number of steps that raised barriers to a
successful antitrust claim based on RPM, even under the per se
7
standard. In fact, from a practical standpoint, Dr. Miles, if not
depending on the practice. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80
(1999).
5. On April 14, 2009, Maryland became the first state to enact legislation
making RPM unlawful despite Leegin. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW
§ 11-204(b) (LexisNexis 2009). At the federal level, a bill introduced in July
2009, provides: “Any agreement setting a price below which a product or service
cannot be sold by a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor shall violate section 1 of
the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1).” H.R. 3190, 111th Cong. 2 (2009). Numerous
state attorneys general have joined in support of the bill. See Letter from Nat’l
Ass’n of Atty’s Gen. to John Conyers, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm. &
Lamar Smith, Ranking Member, House Judiciary Comm. 1–5 (Oct. 27, 2009),
available at http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/20091027.HR_3190.pdf
(urging the House to pass H.R. 3190 and bearing signatures of forty-one state
attorneys general). By the summer of 2010 California, Michigan, and Illinois
had joined Maryland in making RPM per se unlawful. For an excellent survey,
see Richard Liebeskind & Joseph R. Tiffany, Two Years After Leegin, Questions
Remain on Lawfulness of Resale Price Maintenance, ADVISORY (Pillsbury
Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP, New York, NY), July 31, 2009, available at
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/053986E13BCE687E8E0CA
54E89372048.pdf. In March 2008, after Leegin, New York, Illinois, and
Michigan settled an RPM dispute (via consent decree) with furniture
manufacturer Herman Miller. See Stipulated Final Judgment and Consent
Decree, New York v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 08-CV-02977 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,
2008), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/antitrust/pdfs/Signed
_FJ.pdf.
6. See generally Thomas C. Arthur, The Core of Antitrust and the Slow
Death of Dr. Miles, 62 SMU L. REV. 437 (2009); Jordan A. Dresnick & Thomas
A. Tucker Ronzetti, Vertical Price Agreements in the Wake of Leegin v. PSKS:
Where Do We Stand Now?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229 (2009); Warren Grimes, The
Path Forward After Leegin: Seeking Consensus Reform of Antitrust Laws of
Vertical Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467 (2008); Thomas A. Lambert, Dr.
Miles Is Dead. Now What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason for Evaluating
Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1937 (2009); Lance
McMillian, The Proper Role of the Courts: The Mistakes of the Supreme Court in
Leegin, 2008 WISC. L. REV. 405; Jason A. Casey, Note, The Rule of Reason After
Leegin: Reconsidering the Use of Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Arena, 42
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 919 (2009); Scott Looper, Note, Reading Roberts: A Critical
Framework for Analyzing the Supreme Court’s Decision in Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 46 HOUS. L. REV. 177 (2009); Julie M.
Olszewski, Note, Overruling a Nearly Century-Old Precedent: Why Leegin Got It
Right, 94 IOWA L. REV. 375 (2008).
7. See infra Part II.B. The Court had narrowed the definition of what
constitutes RPM in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485
U.S. 717 (1988) and raised the bar for summary judgment for resellers claiming
to have been terminated as a result of RPM in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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officially overruled, had already become far less important as a case
8
and less influential in affecting business strategy.
Despite this outpouring of discussion, a critical element of
Leegin has not been explored: What is the continuing influence, if
any, of nearly one hundred years of Supreme Court decisions that
were complementary to Dr. Miles? Do they now play the same role
they played in the era of Dr. Miles? For example, are consignment
agreements ever the type of agreements that could lead to antitrust
liability? This Article explains why they should not play the same
role they did in the era of Dr. Miles and the danger of adhering to
the analyses found in those cases. Indeed, if the complementary
cases are not reconsidered, or if their lack of relevance is not at least
understood, they could very well have the effect of undercutting the
new direction Leegin signals.
9
An assessment of Dr. Miles’s orphans is not a simple one. The
task of predicting their future is difficult because the orphaned cases
are not themselves consistent. In fact, they represent two different
approaches depending on how broadly or narrowly the Court wanted
the prohibition of RPM to be applied and the types of antitrust
errors to be avoided. For example, in the period from Dr. Miles in
10
1911 to Continental T. V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. in 1977, the
11
Court, with one major exception, devoted itself to protecting the
per se rule. In other words, the Court generally reacted firmly and
12
This
negatively to efforts to avoid Dr. Miles’s prohibitions.
objective can be viewed as avoiding the error of treating as lawful a
13
After 1977, the Court
practice that is actually anticompetitive.
reversed course and delivered a series of opinions that favored
undermining the rule that RPM is a per se violation of section 1 of
14
Here, the objective clearly was to avoid
the Sherman Act.
condemning a practice that actually was pro-competitive. In effect,
the orphans created by Leegin have sharply differing characteristics.
This difference, as will be explained, reflected a change in the
Court’s view of vertical restraints more generally.
15
Part I briefly describes Dr. Miles and Leegin. Part II explores
the cases decided before and after Sylvania from the perspective of
8. See infra notes 140–41 and accompanying text (explaining that, after
recent cases, “findings that firms have engaged in per se unlawful RPM are
rare”).
9. See infra Part II.
10. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
11. See infra notes 95–108 and accompanying text (discussing United
States v. Park, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960)).
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (1984); Richard S. Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A
Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41 (1984).
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. For a good comprehensive description of Leegin, see Dresnick &
Ronzetti, supra note 6, at 235–49.
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what it means to agree to fix resale prices. It also assesses the
importance of those cases in the aftermath of Leegin. As a general
matter, those cases are characterized by formalistic line drawing
largely in service of the Court’s varying conviction about the
correctness of the per se standard. Part II concludes that, insofar as
Leegin signals a more substantive economic approach to RPM, those
cases have the potential to retard this development and thus must
evolve to fit the new approach.
Part III then examines another set of cases that sought to
distinguish RPM from consignment agreements. This important
distinction—between instances in which goods are sold on
consignment, as opposed to being resold—was for a time a possible
way to avoid the prohibitions of Dr. Miles.
The continued
importance of this distinction is examined. Part III also pulls this
analysis together in light of a limited number of post-Leegin cases.
It suggests that the types of errors these sets of cases were designed
to avoid are no longer a serious concern. Yet, if this is not
recognized by lower courts, the full beneficial effects of Leegin may
16
not be realized.
I. FROM DR. MILES TO LEEGIN
There is probably little to be said about any hundred-year-old
17
This may go double for Dr.
case that has not been said before.
Miles, which has been a focal point of antitrust debate. The case
itself is, however, a bit more complex than simply standing for the
per se status of RPM. In fact, Dr. Miles Medical Company, the retail
price-fixing firm, was the plaintiff that sought to enjoin a wholesaler
who was acquiring Dr. Miles’s products from other wholesalers and
retailers at prices below the resale price those wholesalers had
contractually agreed to and then reselling them at “cut-rate”
18
prices. In effect, the defendant, John D. Park, was interfering with
the contracts Dr. Miles had with its buyers.
Ironically, Dr. Miles invoked a free-rider argument to justify its

16. One possibility is that RPM will become effectively per se lawful. In
fact, since nonprice vertical restraints were moved from the per se category to
the rule of reason category, almost no suits challenging these restraints have
been successful. See infra Part III.B. The Supreme Court in Leegin strongly
suggests that this should not be the case. See infra notes 144–46 and
accompanying text.
17. The articles cited in note 6, supra, represent a small percentage of
articles in which Dr. Miles is of importance. A search of Westlaw, conducted on
August 18, 2010, reveals that the terms “Dr. Miles,” “RPM,” or “resale price
maintenance” have appeared just in the titles of articles 164 times. The terms
have appeared in text of articles over 5000 times.
18. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 374–82
(1911).
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19

restrictions. According to the complaint:
[C]ertain retail establishments, particularly those known as
department stores, had inaugurated a “cut-rate” or “cut-price”
system which had caused “much confusion, trouble and
damage” to the complainant’s business and “injuriously
affected the reputation” and “depleted the sales” of its
remedies; that this injury resulted “from the fact that the
majority of retail druggists as a rule cannot, or believe that
they cannot realize sufficient profits” by the sale of the
medicines “at the cut-prices announced by the cut-rate and
department stores,” and therefore are “unwilling to, and do not
keep” the medicines “in stock” or “if kept in stock, do not urge
or favor sales thereof, but endeavor to foist off some similar
remedy or substitute, and from the fact that in the public mind
an article advertised or announced at ‘cut’ or ‘reduced’ price
from the established price suffers loss of reputation and
20
becomes of inferior value and demand.”

In short, Dr. Miles was disadvantaged as far as interbrand
competition because the resellers of its products were unwilling to
promote them, given the intensity of the intrabrand competition.
It is all history now, of course, but ultimately the Court rejected
a number of justifications offered by Dr. Miles, including the
contentions that secrecy of the formulas gave it the right to control
21
subsequent sale prices and that as manufacturer it could control
22
the resale price. The Court noted that restraints on alienation had
23
long been held to be unlawful. The decision of the Court was not,
however, completely void of a rudimentary economic analysis. The
restraint, according to the Court, may be reasonable if it is
24
advantageous to the parties and not harmful to the public. Here,
the Court asked whether the restriction was comparable to the sale
25
of good will. In some sense, the instincts of the Court were correct
in terms of asking whether it is possible that the public could be
better off by virtue of the agreement. Of course, we now know that
the public may be better off if the intrabrand restraint leads to
26
In 1911, however, this analysis
greater interbrand competition.

19. For those unfamiliar with antitrust law, the irony is that the free-rider
argument eventually became the theoretical basis for permitting vertical
restraints, including RPM.
20. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 375.
21. See id. at 400–04.
22. See id. at 404–08.
23. See id. at 409.
24. Id. at 406.
25. Id. at 407.
26. This is, however, an empirical question that turns largely on the
preferences consumers have for the features added by a firm in order to compete
once it can no longer engage in price competition. The baseline presentations
on RPM are William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market

W06_HARRISON

1130

10/18/2010 11:49:12 AM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

was not in the cards and the Court analogized the agreement to one
between competitors and explained, “[A]greements or combinations
between dealers, having for their sole purpose the destruction of
competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public
27
interest and void.”
Between Dr. Miles and Leegin, the pivotal case, philosophically
28
speaking, is Sylvania. Indeed, it is rightly regarded as the turning
point for antitrust law more generally. Sylvania stands out for a
number of reasons well known to any antitrust scholar, but three of
29
First, the decision changed
which are of particular importance.
the law as it then existed with respect to nonprice vertical restraints
30
on distribution. Prior to that time, albeit for only a short period,
31
The
these types of restraints were viewed as per se unlawful.
strength of the Court’s determination to make the change is
indicated by the fact that the decision could have been much
32
Second, and most importantly, the case
narrower in scope.
signaled, quite loudly in fact, that the Court was adopting a more
economically sophisticated approach to antitrust law, and,
specifically, that it was accepting the view that increases in
interbrand competition may necessitate decreases in intrabrand
33
competition. Third, in a footnote that was to become something of
millstone around the Court’s neck until Leegin was decided thirty
Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985) and
Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON.
86 (1960).
27. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408.
28. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
29. Commentaries in the aftermath of Sylvania include Frank H.
Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
135 (1984); Victor P. Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restraints: A
Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REV. 91 (1979); Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand
“Cartels” Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1982); Robert Pitofsky, The
Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restraints, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1978).
30. These restraints are those placed by a seller on those to whom it sells
with respect to their own sales. For example, the seller may restrict the area or
the types of customers to whom the resellers may sell.
31. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 378, 382
(1967).
32. The Court could have distinguished Schwinn and not overruled it.
Schwinn involved a defendant with a much higher market share than the
defendant in Sylvania and that was employing a greater network of restraints
than found in Sylvania.
33. The central point of the Court’s reasoning was the recognition of freerider effects. These effects occur when a firm is not able to fully internalize or
profit from its own efforts. The classic example in antitrust would be a fullservice seller of audio equipment that offers information, listening rooms, and
comfortable surroundings to would-be shoppers who then leave the store only to
purchase the same equipment online. See generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN &
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS 212–15 (5th ed. 2009).
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years later, the Court rejected the idea that the analysis involved in
nonprice vertical restraints could be applied to vertical restraints on
price. According to the Court:
As in Schwinn, we are concerned here only with nonprice
vertical restrictions. The per se illegality of price restrictions
has been established firmly for many years and involves
significantly different questions of analysis and policy. As MR.
JUSTICE WHITE notes . . . some commentators have argued that
the manufacturer’s motivation for imposing vertical price
restrictions may be the same as for nonprice restrictions.
There are, however, significant differences that could easily
34
justify different treatment.

The Court did not elaborate on what the differences were
between price and nonprice restraints other than to note that
Congress had not reacted to the per se status of RPM in the rule’s
35
Perhaps the Court really could
then sixty-six years of existence.
not think of any economic distinction—possibly because it is hard to
describe one—but was unwilling to overturn a decades-old decision.
The reasoning applied in Sylvania led, of course, to Leegin—
albeit thirty years later. Whether Leegin means effective per se
36
legality for RPM, as Sylvania did for nonprice vertical restraints,
cannot be determined yet. Nevertheless, without any mention of its
footnote in Sylvania, the Court (finally, some would observe)
accepted the fact that the interbrand/intrabrand free-rider analysis
37
The
that was persuasive in Sylvania was applicable to RPM.
Court noted and described the possible anticompetitive

34. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977).
35. See id.
36. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE
460 (6th ed. 2009) (citing Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto
Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 68 (1991)).
37. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890
(2007). It bears noting that Leegin was hardly delivered with the conviction of
Sylvania. Sylvania was a 6–2 decision with Justices Marshall and Brennan
dissenting and with then-Justice Rehnquist abstaining. See Sylvania, 433 U.S.
at 37. Leegin was a 5–4 decision, with Justices Breyer (probably the most
economically sophisticated member of the Court), Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg dissenting. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 880.
In addition to alleviating the free-rider impediment to increased
interbrand competition, the Court discussed the potential of RPM to lower entry
barriers and to encourage resellers to engage in nonprice promotional efforts
whether or not they were discouraged by free riders. See id. at 890–92.
It should also be noted that, since Sylvania, the Court has become clearer
with respect to the relative importance of interbrand and intrabrand
competition, indicating that interbrand competition has a significantly higher
priority. See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S.
164, 180–81 (2006) (“Interbrand competition . . . is the ‘primary concern of
antitrust law.’” (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S., at 50 n.19)).
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38

consequences of RPM. For example, in an industry populated by a
small number of producers or manufacturers, the ability to engage
in successful price fixing could be affected by the ability to control
39
price cutting by resellers. In addition, RPM might be established
at the behest of a cartel of retailers desiring to avoid price
competition independent of any positive effects on the interbrand
40
Similarly, a particularly powerful retailer could use its
market.
leverage as a buyer to insist on RPM, as the Court put it, “to
41
forestall innovation in distribution that decreases costs.”
Compared to its decision in Sylvania, the Court expressed itself in
ways that suggest greater concern that vertical price restraints have
greater anticompetitive potential than nonprice restraints.
Consequently, the Leegin Court cautioned that “the potential
anticompetitive consequences of vertical price restraints must not be
42
ignored or underestimated.” As already noted, it is impossible at
this juncture to know whether RPM will evolve to be de facto per se
legal. The cautionary language in Leegin, however, invites or even
instructs lower courts to ensure this does not occur.
II. DR. MILES’S ORPHANS AND THE CONCEPT OF AN AGREEMENT ON
PRICE
A.

Pre-Sylvania Cases: Is There an Agreement?

As noted in the Introduction, prior to Sylvania the Supreme
Court sought to define Dr. Miles’s parameters in a way that fully
condemned even indirect ways to accomplish RPM. The cases
actually concern two matters that can be intertwined. First, was
43
Second, did the agreement pertain to the
there an agreement?
44
resale price? Five cases in the pre-Sylvania period are particularly
important.
Eight years after Dr. Miles, the Court began deciding a series of
38. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892–94.
39. Id. at 892.
40. Id. at 893.
41. Id. Presumably the Court means that there would be little incentive for
a retailer to seek lower costs if it could not then compete on the basis of price.
Of course this would not mean the more innovative retailer would not profit by
virtue of its lower costs. The Court also suggests that a powerful manufacturer
would use RPM as a way to discourage its resellers from selling the products of
the manufacturer’s competitors. Id. at 894.
More recently, in McDonough v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 461,
466–68, (E.D. Pa. 2009), the claim was that a large retailer pressured
manufacturers to impose RPM to limit competition by online discounters.
42. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894.
43. The fact of an agreement is necessitated by section 1 of the Sherman
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
44. For most of this period nonprice vertical restraints were not per se
unlawful, meaning that classification of the activity as price or nonprice was
critical. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.

W06_HARRISON

2010]

10/18/2010 11:49:12 AM

DR. MILES’S ORPHANS

1133

cases that fell squarely in the area of form versus substance. The
first of these was United States v. Colgate & Co., which was
inconsistent with the theme of protecting the per se rule and became
45
something of a judicial headache for many years. The decision is
generally cited for the proposition that a manufacturer can
announce a resale price and refuse to deal with or terminate a
reseller that does not adhere to that price. In more specific terms,
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, announcements and refusals to
deal with those who do not adhere to those prices does not establish
46
the existence of an agreement.
What Colgate reflects about the Court’s view of RPM is unclear.
On one hand, the outcome is driven by the fact that section 1 does
require an agreement. On the other hand, the actual practice of one
party announcing terms and another one adhering to those terms,
from the perspective of basic contract law, may very well establish
the existence of an agreement. The proper interpretation of Colgate
is made difficult because it deals with a criminal charge and the
47
interpretation of an indictment. The indictment listed a variety of
48
Colgate’s practices that would fall short of an agreement. It also
listed practices that did indicate the existence of an agreement.
Thus, according to the indictment, Colgate was involved in
“investigation and discovery of those not adhering [to resale prices
and] requests to offending dealers for assurances and promises of
49
For some
future adherence to prices, which were often given.”
unexplained reason, despite this language, the trial court concluded
that the indictment included “no charge . . . that any contract was
50
entered into by . . . the defendant, and any of its retail customers.”
Later in the same opinion the trial court said, “In the view taken by
the court, the indictment here fairly presents the question of
whether
a
manufacturer . . .is
subject
to
criminal
prosecution . . . because he agrees with his wholesale and retail
51
customers, upon prices.”
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court viewed its task as
“ascertain[ing], as accurately as may be, what interpretation the
52
trial court placed on the indictment.” In examining the indictment
and the trial court opinion, the Court concluded that ultimately the
trial court had interpreted the indictment to mean no more than the
defendant had requested adherence to price, sometimes in advance,
and then refused to sell to those who did not adhere to those

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306–07 (1919).
See id. at 307.
See id. at 302.
See id. at 302–04.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 304.
Id.
Id. at 306.
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53

prices.
This was a questionable interpretation given that the
indictment also said dealers were requested to promise they would
adhere to the resale prices and in many instances provided that
54
In fact, in still another passage, the trial court
assurance.
observed:
The pregnant fact should never be lost sight of that no
averment is made of any contract or agreement having been
entered into whereby the defendant, the manufacturer, and his
customers, bound themselves to enhance and maintain prices,
further than is involved in the circumstances that the
manufacturer, the defendant here, refused to sell to persons
who would not resell at indicated prices, and that certain
55
retailers made purchases on this condition . . . .

One reading of this passage, offered by Professor Thomas Arthur, is
not that there is no agreement but that the only way to enforce the
56
agreement was to refuse to supply.
In many respects the lower court and the Supreme Court’s
definition of what constituted an agreement would not survive a
more modern analysis. This can be understood by thinking of the
announcement, “I will only sell to you if you will not resell for less
than $10.00.” The retailer thereafter adheres to the price. Under
basic contract law principles, the outcome could easily be squared
with the existence of an implied agreement. The initial assertion is
an offer indicating the actions required of the offeree in order to
ensure performance by the offeror. Under the facts of the case, it
does not appear that retailers adhering to resale prices did so
because it spontaneously occurred to them to do so. They were, in
fact, complying in order to be assured of the reciprocal performance
57
by the supplier. Yet the Colgate Court and the lower court viewed
the manufacturer as doing no more than exercising its rights to
58
decide with whom it will deal. The problem is that the company
went further than merely exercising its right to decide with whom it
will deal—the Court’s choice was based on reciprocity by the
resellers. Colgate thus can just as easily be read as exempting
certain types of agreements from its prohibition of RPM as it can be
read as a reaction to unilateral action. Indeed, in 1949 one
commentator remarked, “The Colgate case virtually invited resale
59
price maintenance.”
53. Id. at 306–07.
54. Id. at 303.
55. Id. at 305.
56. See Arthur, supra note 6, at 463.
57. See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 303–04.
58. See id. at 305–07. Of course the unilateral right to determine with
whom one will deal is a fundamental characteristic of all contracts. See 17A
AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 222 (2004).
59. Comment, Refusals To Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58 YALE.
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It is hard not to see the Colgate decision as being more trouble
than it was worth. In fact, for three years in a row beginning in
1920, the Supreme Court attempted to “clarify” Colgate without
60
conceding that it was simply wrong. Ultimately, however, in 1964
the Court appeared to relent and characterized Colgate as a case in
61
Under that
which it “assumed” there was no agreement.
interpretation of the decision, the outcome is a necessary one. In the
meantime, clarification was required because the Dr. Miles/Colgate
distinction was far from obvious, especially to those attempting to
apply basic contract law principles. In fact, to some courts, the only
62
distinction appeared to be whether the agreement was in writing.
63
In United States v. A. Schrader’s Son, Inc., a 1920 case, the
lower court described Colgate as a case in which a “combination or
64
conspiracy” was “clearly disclosed” and further observed that the
difference between Dr. Miles and Colgate was a “distinction without
65
The lower court’s description of the Colgate facts
a difference.”
seemed directly on point:
In the Colgate Case the predetermined purpose of the maker,
known to all the wholesalers and retailers, was to market a
product at certain fixed prices. Every wholesaler or retail
dealer who acquiesced therein or acted in furtherance of the
accomplishment of that purpose made himself a member of a
66
conspiracy.

In light of Colgate, and faced with perhaps even more
compelling evidence of an agreement, the lower court felt
constrained to rule that there had been no violation of the Sherman
67
Act.
L.J. 1121, 1127 (1948).
60. See, e.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 451–52 (1922).
It does not appear that the Court had changed with respect to its conviction
that RPM was per se unlawful. See id. Instead it just seemed unwilling to
revisit Colgate in a manner that might be interpreted as dropping the
agreement requirement. See id.
61. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 17 (1964).
62. See, e.g., Beech-Nut Packing, 257 U.S. at 451 (“The Circuit Court of
Appeals was of opinion that the only difference between the price-fixing
condemned as unlawful in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, and the price-fixing plan embodied in the Beech-Nut policy was that in the
former case there was an agreement in writing, while in this case . . . the plan
depended upon a tacit understanding . . . .”); United States v. A. Schrader’s Son,
Inc., 264 F. 175, 183 (N.D. Ohio 1919), rev’d, 252 U.S. 85 (1920) (“I can see no
real difference upon the facts between the Dr. Miles Medical Co. Case and the
Colgate Co. Case.
The only difference is that in the former the
arrangement . . . was put in writing . . . .”).
63. 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
64. A. Schrader’s Son, 264 F. at 180.
65. Id. at 183.
66. Id. at 184.
67. See id. at 185. Interestingly, this holding placed the government in the

W06_HARRISON

1136

10/18/2010 11:49:12 AM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

The Supreme Court, in a somewhat tersely worded opinion,
68
reversed the lower court, noting that the defendants in Schrader
69
Once again, the
had gone beyond the actions found in Colgate.
distinction was between announcing a policy then exercising
70
unilateral rights and the existence of actual agreements.
A year later the Court was required to clarify the issue again in
Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., a civil case involving the
71
effort by Cudahy to control the resale price of Old Dutch Cleanser.
The case first arose in the period between Dr. Miles and Colgate and
72
resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiff. The case then reached
73
the court of appeals after Colgate, and the decision was reversed.
The jury instruction was to the effect that an agreement can be
inferred from repeated announcements by the manufacturer of the
resale price and cooperation by the resellers by virtue of adherence
74
The appellate court reversed, noting that because
to that price.
there was no formal written or oral agreement and, in light of
Colgate, there should have been a directed verdict for the
75
The Supreme Court affirmed, but not without noting
defendant.
that under Colgate and A. Schrader’s Son, which was also decided
76
Thus, an
by that point, no formal agreement was necessary.
agreement “might be implied from a course of dealing or other
77
circumstances.” Nevertheless, the Court held that an instruction
that permitted the finder of fact to infer an agreement existed from
repeated announcements and adherence to the resale price was
78
incorrect.
The next year the issue was considered yet again in FTC v.
79
Beech-Nut had a practice of announcing
Beech-Nut Packing Co.
resale prices and refusing to sell to those who did not adhere to
80
After “declarations, assurances, statements,
those prices.
position of arguing that there was a meaningful distinction between the efforts
by the manufacturers in Dr. Miles and Colgate. See id. at 183–84.
68. A. Schrader’s Son, 252 U.S. at 100.
69. Id. at 98–100.
70. See id. at 99–100.
71. Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 209 (1921).
72. See id. at 209–10.
73. See id. at 210.
74. Id. at 210–11.
75. Id. at 210.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 211. Three Justices dissented, arguing that the repeated
announcements and subsequent adherence to the announced resale prices
would at least raise a question of fact to which the jury should be permitted to
respond. Id. at 218. This view is more consistent with contract law principles.
For example, it would be a relatively simple matter for the offer to be viewed as
“I will sell to you as long as you resell for no less than $2.00,” after which an
acceptance is found in the fact that the buyer resells for no less than $2.00.
79. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
80. Id. at 447–48.
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promises, or similar expressions” that the prices would be adhered
81
to, the dealer would be reinstated. The Federal Trade Commission
82
(“FTC”) had issued a cease and desist order on this practice. On
appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the
distinction between Dr. Miles and the policy in question was that
Dr. Miles involved a written agreement while the agreements in the
83
It noted that there was no
case before the court were tacit.
84
It reversed the FTC, reasoning that the
substantive distinction.
85
case was governed by Colgate. In effect, if there was no agreement
in Colgate, the Beech-Nut policy also could not be held to involve an
agreement.
Referring to both Schrader’s Son and Cudahy Packing, the
Supreme Court pointed out that the difference was not between
86
Instead, the Court
written agreements and tacit agreements.
noted that in Colgate it responded to a lower court’s interpretation
87
According to the Court, the lower court in
of an indictment.
Colgate had found that the company did no more than announce
under what conditions it would sell to resellers, but no agreement
existed that obligated those resellers to observe the resale price once
88
After seeming to clarify Colgate, the
they possessed the goods.
remainder of the Court’s reasoning is less than clear. The Court
noted that the FTC had not found that Beech-Nut’s conduct did not
89
constitute a “contract or contracts whereby resale prices are fixed.”
On the other hand, the Court reasoned that “The specific facts found
show suppression of the freedom of competition by methods in which
the company secures the cooperation of its distributors and
customers, which are quite as effectual as agreements express or
90
implied intended to accomplish the same purpose.” The distinction
between an agreement, express or implied; suppression of freedom
that is as effective as agreements; and the “unilateral” action in
Colgate was never made by the Court.
In fact, the distinction, if it existed, would have been
extraordinarily fine because Beech-Nut conditioned sales on the
receipt of assurances that resale price would be observed. There
appears no doubt that the Court desired to preserve Colgate but
precisely what freedom those who desired to fix resale price enjoyed
was exceptionally narrow. In the words of a writer at the time,

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 450.
Id. at 443–44.
Id. at 451.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 452–53.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 451–52.
Id. at 455.
Id.
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[W]hatever the present status of the Colgate case, one thing
seems clear—the passage to the legal methods of that case,
which the Court has assumed to preserve between the Scylla
and Charybdis of the subsequent decisions, is narrow and
dangerous, and the manufacturer who would take advantage
91
of the passage will need a truly skilful pilot.

The final pre-Sylvania chapter of the Dr. Miles/Colgate saga
92
came in a 1959 case, United States v. Parke, Davis & Co, a decision
that came close to overruling Colgate and, from some perspectives,
93
Parke, Davis & Co. sold drugs to both wholesalers and
did so.
94
retailers. Retailers acquired the drug from wholesalers and, in the
95
Parke,
case of large orders, from Parke, Davis & Co. directly.
Davis & Co. announced resale prices for both wholesalers and
retailers and warned that it would not sell to those who did not
96
In addition, the wholesalers were told they
adhere to the price.
would not be supplied if any of the retailers they sold to did not
97
The wholesalers would report the
observe the minimum price.
names of retailers violating the policy and Parke, Davis & Co. would
98
terminate deliveries.
The lower court determined that Parke, Davis & Co. activity fell
99
The Supreme
within Colgate and ruled against the government.
Court reversed once again, attempting to distinguish ultimately
Colgate as well as Dr. Miles from the activities of Parke, Davis &
100
This time, according to the Court,
Co.
91. Comment, Price Maintenance and the Beechnut Decision, 31 YALE L.J.
650, 655 (1922). In the words of another commentator, “It requires Herculean
efforts to square [the decisions in Cudahy and Schrader’s Sons], and the Dr.
Miles decision, with the right to select customers, recognized by Colgate.”
Walter Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967,
980 (1955).
92. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
93. See, e.g., Recent Case, Sales to Wholesalers Conditioned on Their
Refusal To Sell to Price Cutting Retailers Who Are Informed of Such a Policy
Constitutes a Combination and Conspiracy, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1237, 1242
(1960). In addition, the dissenters in Parke, Davis & Co. seemed to feel the
majority had effectively overruled Colgate. See Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at
49 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
94. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 31–32.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 32.
97. Id. at 33.
98. When confronted with the problem of price cutters, Parke, Davis & Co.
consulted counsel who advised them that “we can lawfully say ‘we will sell you
only so long as you observe such minimum retail prices’ but cannot say ‘we will
sell you only if you agree to observe such minimum retail prices.’” Id. at 33
(internal quotation marks omitted). Parke, Davis & Co.’s efforts met with
limited success in that some retailers refused to adhere to the minimum price
and were terminated. They were reinstated—temporarily—when they stopped
advertising discount prices. Id. at 35–36.
99. Id. at 36.
100. Id. at 38, 45–46.
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[A]n unlawful combination is not just as such arises from a
price maintenance agreement, express or implied; such a
combination is also organized if the producer secures
adherence to his suggested prices by means which go beyond
his mere declination to sell to a customer who will not observe
101
his announced policy.

In this case, the excessive conduct was evidently the fact that Parke,
Davis & Co. “used the refusal to deal with the wholesalers in order
to elicit their willingness to deny Parke Davis products to
102
The majority so narrowed Colgate that three dissenting
retailers.”
103
104
Justices and one concurring Justice seemed to believe that the
Court had effectively overturned Colgate. Exactly how much
Colgate was narrowed is hard to assess. It appears, however, that
at least for a time, any agreement with any party—even though that
party had no interest in the success of the price-fixing efforts—
105
would exceed Colgate’s limits.
As noted earlier, the string of cases from Dr. Miles to Parke,
Davis & Co. represents the pre-Sylvania approach of the Court to
RPM. RPM was per se illegal, and the definition of an agreement
was broadly defined. Dr. Miles, of course, is no longer applicable,
but the cases that represented the Court’s struggle to contain Dr.
Miles remain. Although perhaps not correct as an economic matter,
the Court seemed to be concerned that what it viewed as
anticompetitive agreements would escape detection. In assessing
them, there are two important factors to note. First, the continuing
importance of the Colgate line of cases is not simply dependent on
Leegin but on the post-1977 cases in which RPM was alleged. The
next Subpart is devoted to these cases.
The second thing to note is that, although all the cases dealt
with RPM, they dealt with a specific element of an RPM claim—
whether there was an agreement. The agreement element is also
necessary in the context of all vertical restraints, not simply those
related to price. Thus, for a ten-year span these cases potentially
101. Id. at 43.
102. Id. at 45.
103. Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker dissented, arguing that
the Court had “done no less than send to its demise the Colgate doctrine.” Id. at
49 (Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting).
104. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
105. In the pre-Sylvania period, this is consistent with other announcements
by the Court. For example, in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968),
overruled on other grounds by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), a
newspaper publisher sought to stop one carrier from charging above a desired
maximum price. In order to accomplish this it hired another party to solicit
away the carrier’s customers. The party would not, however, take over the
route and charge only the agreement maximum. In other words, it ultimately
had little or no interest in the subsequent maximum price fixing scheme.
Nevertheless, the Court held that the agreement with that party could satisfy
the agreement requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 149–50.
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had increased importance. In the period between 1967 and 1977,
nonprice vertical restraints joined RPM in the per se unlawful
106
Thus, the law during that period would have meant that
category.
simply announcing one’s policy with respect to nonprice restraints
would have been permissible, but an agreement, implied or express,
or any “arrangement” that exceeded Colgate would have meant
liability under section 1. In the post-1977 period, we now know that,
under the rule of reason, it is virtually unheard of for a plaintiff to
107
In effect,
prevail on a claim based on nonprice restraint.
regardless of the difficulty or ease of showing an agreement existed,
the plaintiffs lose and the agreement element has become of minor
108
importance. That is not to say, as will be discussed below, that
the same is true of RPM.
B.

Post-Sylvania: What Does It Mean To Fix Prices?

It appears it did not take the Supreme Court long after its
footnote in Sylvania to have second thoughts about the legal status
109
of RPM. In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., decided
seven years later, the Court confronted the problems of a dual
approach to vertical restraints. Price restraints were per se
unlawful while nonprice vertical restraints were subject to the rule
of reason. The problem was that it is not always easy to detect the
difference—particularly if one applies anything other than the
narrowest possible definition of RPM.
In this respect there is a formalistic and a substantive
approach. As a substantive matter, RPM refers to any agreement
that stifles price competition among intrabrand competitors. This
broader definition would be consistent with the Court’s definition of
price fixing in the context of horizontal arrangements. In that area
the standard is to prohibit any action that has the effect of “raising,
110
A more
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing” price.
formalistic view is that price fixing does not occur unless the parties
agree on an actual price. If that formalistic approach were applied
111
to horizontal restraints, an agreement to restrict output,
112
113
discontinue credit terms, or not to engage in competitive bidding
would not be price fixing because prices could still differ from seller
106. See infra notes 191–98 and accompanying text.
107. The exceptions are quite limited. See generally, e.g., Graphic Prods.
Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983); Eiberger v. Sony Corp.,
622 F.2d 1068 (2nd Cir. 1980); Moecker v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d
1291 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
108. See infra Part II.B–C.
109. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
110. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 220, 223 (1940).
111. This was in fact the activity in Socony-Vacuum. Id. at 220.
112. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per
curiam).
113. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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to seller. All of these have been held to be price fixing in the
horizontal context but would not be in the vertical context under a
formalistic approach.
In Monsanto, resellers complained that Spray-Rite, a
115
Monsanto
competitor, was selling at discounted prices.
terminated the resale contract with Spray-Rite, which claimed that
the termination was in furtherance of a per se unlawful agreement
116
Spray-Rite prevailed at the trial court level
to fix resale prices.
117
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
and Monsanto appealed.
Circuit affirmed, reasoning that, if there had been complaints about
price discounting and then termination, a jury would be entitled to
infer the existence of a vertical agreement on price between
118
Monsanto, on the other
Monsanto and the complaining resellers.
hand, argued that the termination was due to Spray-Rite’s failure to
119
The dilemma was
hire trained salesmen and to promote sales.
that even this requirement could cause resale prices to increase and
possibly stabilize.
The Court was faced with the inevitable intertwining of two
issues raised by section 1 of the Sherman Act. First, of course, was
whether there was an agreement between Monsanto and its
resellers. After Sylvania, simply showing the existence of a vertical
120
This
agreement was not enough to establish a per se violation.
meant addressing the second issue: distinguishing price from
nonprice agreements. This second step was necessary to avoid the
error of condemning pro-competitive nonprice vertical restraints
that also had the effect of raising resale prices. Put differently, a
view that priority was to be placed on discouraging RPM would
mean adopting a policy that could chill lawful and pro-competitive
efforts to employ nonprice vertical restraints. On the other hand,
affording a wide berth to nonvertical restraints would mean that
121
Perhaps reflecting the
RPM agreements could go undetected.
view that it was hard to distinguish the effects of price and nonprice
122
restraints, the Court adopted a policy of decreasing the likelihood
123
It did this not by
of condemning any pro-competitive restraints.
114. See supra notes 91–93.
115. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 758–59 (1984).
116. Id. at 757.
117. See id. at 757–58.
118. Id. at 758.
119. Id. at 757.
120. The Court expressly declined a request to remove RPM from the per se
category. Id. at 752 n.7.
121. The choice is between the mistake of condemning pro-competitive
activities and the mistake of allowing anticompetitive activities.
122. In fact, the Court observes, “the economic effect of . . . unilateral and
concerted vertical price setting, agreements on price and nonprice
restrictions . . . is in many, but not all, cases similar or identical.” Monsanto,
465 U.S. at 762.
123. Id. at 764.
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clarifying the distinction between price and nonprice restraints, but
by raising the standard for plaintiffs to the requirement of showing
an agreement existed. Consequently, the Court held that in order to
avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs would be required to present
evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer
124
and nonterminated distributors were acting independently.”
The choice the Court made here with respect to the way it
framed and responded to the issue is noteworthy. The complaint
125
At the trial
alleged that the defendant had conspired to fix prices.
court level, the issue was precisely that, with the jury instructed
that RPM was per se unlawful. The Court could have responded
with a narrow holding that required courts to instruct juries about
the distinction to be made between price and nonprice agreements.
Instead, it opted to address the arguably broader issue of whether
126
In Monsanto, the alleged agreement
an agreement existed at all.
was to fix prices, but the Court’s decision was not constrained to
127
Instead, it raised the bar with respect to all
price fixing only.
128
vertical restraints.
The last of the Court’s post-Sylvania decisions that undercut
Dr. Miles and the Court’s subsequent assertion in Sylvania that
RPM was different from nonprice vertical restraints was Business
129
The theme in the
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
case was similar to Monsanto in that it was made necessary by the
different treatment of vertical nonprice and vertical price restraints.
Business Electronics was initially the only seller of Sharp’s
calculators in Houston, Texas. An additional seller was appointed
and eventually complained to Sharp that Business Electronics was
130
pricing below the minimum prices suggested by Sharp.
Eventually, Business Electronics was terminated and claimed that
Sharp had engaged in RPM. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that per se unlawful RPM existed only “if there is an
131
expressed or implied agreement to set resale prices at some level.”
What distinguished Business Electronics from Monsanto is that
in Business Electronics, defendant Sharp made no effort to argue
that it had imposed nonprice vertical restraints on the nonterminated reseller that would have raised its costs. In other words,
there was no argument that a restriction of RPM would actually
have an impact on nonprice vertical restraints.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 757.
126. Id. at 763–65.
127. See id. at 765–68.
128. Interestingly, the Court then went on to find that there was sufficient
evidence to support a holding that Monsanto had actually entered into per se
unlawful pricing agreements. Id. at 765–66.
129. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
130. Id. at 721.
131. Id. at 720.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit, once again
noting its concerns that the policies and economic priorities
announced in Sylvania would be thwarted by a broad definition of
132
It noted that nearly any nonprice vertical agreement
price fixing.
133
The Court
could be cast as one having an impact on resale prices.
also explained that the rationale for prohibiting RPM was that it
134
In other words, RPM was to be
could facilitate cartelization.
avoided not because it was inherently anticompetitive but because it
could be a means to accomplish horizontal price fixing. The Court
then used this premise as a means of narrowing Dr. Miles.
Accordingly, it reasoned that if the principal concern was the
creation of a cartel, this outcome would be less likely if the
manufacturers and resellers, who were instruments toward this
135
This idea is
end, did not have agreements on actual price levels.
better understood by an example. Suppose all major oil refiners
would like to engage in horizontal price fixing. If they all resell to
service stations that are engaged in fierce competition, it will be
more difficult to maintain the effectiveness of the cartel at the
refinery level. There would be constant pressure from retailers for
lower prices, and lower prices by one set of retailers may lead to the
conclusion by other refiners that a competing refiner is cheating on
the cartel. In effect, each member of the cartel can stabilize the
cartel by agreeing with retailers on resale prices. In the Court’s
view, this objective could only be achieved if there were an actual
agreement on price itself, something that was absent under the facts
136
of Business Electronics.
Business Electronics, for all practical purposes, ended the reign
137
After Business Electronics, evidently the only way to
of Dr. Miles.
engage in unlawful RPM was to not only have just an agreement
stabilizing resale price, but also have an agreement on the actual
price level.
Even before Business Electronics, threats and
subsequent capitulation by resellers had already escaped the
prohibition of Dr. Miles. After Business Electronics, it was clear that
agreements except those pegging a specific price were also exempt.
Indeed, after Monsanto and Business Electronics, findings that firms
138
have engaged in per se unlawful RPM are rare.

132. Id. at 726, 736.
133. Id. at 727–28.
134. Id. at 725.
135. Id. at 727.
136. See id. at 721–27.
137. Forty-two state attorneys general filed briefs urging the Court to
reverse the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 718 n.*.
138. One particular case in the last twenty years drew a great deal of
attention because it did address RPM. See Nine W. Grp., Inc., No. 981-0386,
2000 WL 250227 (F.T.C. Mar. 6, 2000). The FTC order in Nine West was
modified after Leegin. See Nine W. Grp., Inc., No. C-3937, 2008 WL 2061410
(F.T.C. May 6, 2008).
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Agreements Post-Leegin

Leegin does not expressly overrule any of the cases discussed
thus far. Technically, they do not address the issue of the per se or
rule of reason status of RPM. What Leegin does do, in a way that is
hard to ignore, is call into question the relevance and necessity of
these cases. In fact, it may be that without a reinterpretation of
these cases, they actually impede the more economically sensitive
approach Leegin seems to offer.
The explanation for this requires once again noting that the preLeegin cases fall into two categories. The pre-Sylvania period was
marked by an effort to narrow as much as possible the
circumstances under which RPM could be imposed subject to the
Sherman Act requirement that an agreement must be involved and
139
The process
the Court’s reluctance to expressly overrule Colgate.
is the source of considerable irony. While narrowing the scope of
methods allowed to establish resale pricing, the Court actually
stopped far short of what might have been expected. Under the
guise of upholding the requirement that an agreement be involved,
it established the Colgate doctrine and either misread the actions of
the lower court or ignored basic contract principles concerning
140
After Sylvania, either
implied agreements or understandings.
because the Court recognized the inconsistency of different
treatment of RPM and nonprice vertical restraint or as a method of
protecting possible pro-competitive nonprice vertical restraints, it
changed course. With cases that seem to pull in opposite directions,
it is quite difficult to confidently predict the future importance of the
cases.
That, however, may not be the most important point. The most
important point is that those two lines of cases may give rise to a
new approach to the agreement question. To understand why,
consider the types of antitrust errors the Court sought to avoid. The
first group of cases—pre-Sylvania—were consistent with a view that
RPM was anticompetitive, and the error to be avoided was to allow
indirect methods of setting resale prices. As noted below, it is not
clear that the actual decisions by the Court were the most wellconsidered with respect to achieving this goal, but that does appear
to be the focus. Now, of course, that premise for the treatment of
the agreement issue is no longer required because there is no need
to protect the per se rule.
The second group of cases reflects an effort to avoid the error of
mistaking a nonprice restraint for a price restraint. The theory was
to protect the possibly pro-competitive nonprice vertical restraints
from inadvertent per se treatment. Now, that too is no longer
relevant. Even if a nonprice vertical agreement is classified as a

139. See supra Part II.A.
140. See supra notes 43–62 and accompanying text.
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pricing agreement, the competitive assessment will be the same. In
effect, both the pre- and post-Sylvania cases were designed to avoid
errors that Leegin makes unlikely to occur. The point is that the
error-avoiding goals of these two lines of cases are no longer
relevant.
Further decreasing the relevance of the cases that sought to
clarify when an agreement existed is that there is little reason for a
firm to attempt to conceal vertical agreements. This might be
compared to the pre-Leegin era in which a firm attempting to
establish pro-competitive RPM would be wise not to do it at all, to do
it indirectly, or to conceal it. Now concealment would seem to make
sense in two instances only. First, the firm may believe that its
RPM efforts are likely to be correctly or mistakenly viewed as
anticompetitive under the rule of reason. Second, concealing the
agreement may mean it raises the cost of discovery, which, at the
margin, lowers the likelihood that a violation will be found to be
unlawful.
In order to further assess the proper role of the agreement
analysis post-Leegin, it is also useful to recall that the Leegin Court
appeared to be more sanguine about the pro-competitive effects of
RPM as opposed to nonvertical restraints. In this respect, it
admonished that “the potential anticompetitive consequences of
141
vertical price restraints must not be ignored or underestimated.”
142
In fact, as discussed above, the Court lists a number of ways RPM
143
As a
may have little to do with increasing interbrand competition.
complement to the actual assessment of effects of RPM, one
important step is to apply principles to the question of whether an
agreement exists that are more consistent with contract law.
What this analysis suggests is that the agreement analysis
should not be utilized to shelter vertical agreements. Instead, the
emphasis should be shifted to the substantive economic analysis of
the impact. More specifically, the Court should be more receptive to
evidence of implicit agreements that can be inferred from
suggestions (offers) and compliance (acceptance). In addition, while
there should be some evidence to exclude the possibility of unilateral
action, the idea that price fixing must be narrowly defined so as to
include an agreement on an actual price, has no positive impact, and
may serve simply to preclude the substantive scrutiny Leegin calls
for.
To this point there are no cases in which a lower court has had
to revisit the issue of what is required in order for the existence of
an agreement to be shown. One of the few post-Leegin RPM cases is
141. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 894
(2007). The Court also noted that “courts . . . have to be diligent in eliminating
[the] anticompetitive uses [of RPM] from the market.” Id. at 897.
142. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
143. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892–94.
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144

Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc.
The allegation in the case
was that the defendant, Toys “R” Us, doing business as Babies “R”
Us, had conspired with manufacturers of baby products to fix the
145
The manufacturers were selling to
resale price of these products.
Internet discounters who were undercutting the prices offered at
146
Babies “R” Us was a powerful
Babies “R” Us retail outlets.
147
Indeed,
enough buyer to make demands on these manufacturers.
it is noteworthy that the scheme fit precisely one of the possibilities
that the Leegin Court had cautioned lower courts to be sensitive to.
As described by the Leegin Court: “A dominant retailer . . . might
request resale price maintenance to forestall innovation in
distribution that decreases costs. A manufacturer might consider it
has little choice but to accommodate the retailer’s demands for
vertical price restraints if the manufacturer believes it needs access
148
to the retailer’s distribution network.”
The Babyage.com court noted that the plaintiff’s theory involved
149
One was between Babies “R” Us and the
two agreements.
manufacturers and the other between the manufacturers and the
150
With respect to the
resellers who were originally discounting.
first agreement, the court applied the Monsanto rule of requiring
151
sufficient evidence to exclude the possibility of unilateral action.
It held that plaintiffs had stated a claim for conspiracy based on
evidence that (1) Babies “R” Us was large enough to place the
manufacturers under duress, (2) Babies “R” Us had threatened each
manufacturer with a loss of business if the prices of their other
customers were not controlled, and (3) the manufacturers had
pursued a parallel course of action that would not be in their
152
The
individual self-interest unless all manufacturers cooperated.
standard applied by the court may reflect some of the loosening
described here. For example, the scenario could be trimmed to its
basics—Babies “R” Us announced a policy of not buying from
manufacturers who did not control the resale prices of its other
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

558 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
See id. at 579.
Id.
See id.
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893–94 (2007) (citing THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR.
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 31
(1983), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/233105.pdf).
149. Babyage.com, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 582.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 582–83. In another opinion involving class-certification issues,
the arrangements between Babies “R” Us and the manufacturers are described
in a manner that is more consistent with express agreements. See McDonough
v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 461, 468–72 (E.D. Pa. 2009). Since these
arrangements were, however, pre-Leegin, it seems more likely that they were
the results of efforts to “influence” resale prices as opposed to reaching
agreements on resale prices.
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retailers. It is not at all clear that the parallel action analysis of the
court was correct. Any manufacturer who refused would lose its
best customers without regard for the actions of other
manufacturers. Nevertheless, from a basic contract law perspective,
Toys “R” Us made an offer that was accepted. The fact that it could
be described as unilateral action is beside the point. In fact, every
contract is in some sense an instance of unilateral action.
The second set of agreements—between the manufacturers and
their other customers—according to the court, was also adequately
153
It is not clear whether these agreements were express or
alleged.
the result of announcements and threats to discontinue sales if
154
Given that the events
minimum prices were not observed.
occurred prior to Leegin, it is not surprising that the defendants
argued that the outcome was not the result of agreements but was,
155
Nevertheless, the scenario can be
instead, protected by Colgate.
seen as a series of vertical agreements between Babies “R” Us and
its manufacturers/suppliers that led to vertical agreements between
those manufacturers and their customers. Ultimately the court
avoided the formalistic line-drawing found in pre-Sylvania cases to
avoid one type of antitrust error, on the one hand, and in Monsanto
and Business Electronics to avoid another type of error. Adherence
to those rules would have served little purpose except to detract the
analysis from the real question of substantive economic impact.
III. THE CONSIGNMENT QUESTION
A.

Pre-Leegin

One issue that was prominent in the wake of Dr. Miles was
whether a manufacturer could maintain control over prices by using
a middleman or agent who did not take title to the goods. Again, as
153. Babyage.com, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 583.
154. The more detailed descriptions found in the class-certification opinion
are somewhat ambiguous. See McDonough, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 469–72.
Nevertheless, since these arrangements were pre-Leegin, it seems likely that
they were the result of announcements and threats by the manufacturers.
Interestingly, Toys “R” Us sought the same assurances from
manufacturers of toys. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 931–32 (7th
Cir. 2000). Instead of price restraints, however, Toys “R” Us demanded
limitations on the amount sold to warehouse clubs. Facing resistance from
manufacturers who were concerned about limiting their own sales unless other
manufacturers did the same, Toys “R” Us eventually reached agreements with
each manufacturer on the condition that other manufacturers complied. Id.
This, according to the FTC, changed the agreement from vertical to horizontal.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that there was sufficient
evidence to support this conclusion. Id. at 935.
155. See Defendant Peg Perego’s Joinder in Motion to Dismiss of Toys “R”
Us, Inc., Babies “R” Us, Inc., and Toys “R” Us-Delaware, Inc. at 2, Babyage.com,
Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (Nos. 2:05-cv06792-AB, 2:06-cv-00242-AB), 2006 WL 5295345.
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in the Colgate line of cases, the theme is to avoid the requirement of
section 1 of the Sherman Act that there be an agreement to fix
resale prices. Initially, the question seems to have an obvious
answer. If a firm retains title and uses a network of sales agents, it
is hardly fixing a resale price because there is no resale. Indeed, a
rule that prevents setting the price at which the product would be
sold for the first time makes little sense. On the other hand, section
1 of the Sherman Act can be (and is) broken into two parts. First, is
there an agreement? Second, does the agreement restrain trade?
Agreements with sales agents and consignees are in fact
agreements. In fact, the only relationships that would seem to fall
outside the reach of the Sherman Act are those involving employees
156
Put differently, the use of agents or
or employees of related firms.
consignees may not involve a resale but they are still agreements
and may be anticompetitive.
Two fairly well-known cases form the basis for discussion of the
157
issue. In United States v. General Electric Co., the defendant sold
its light bulbs through more than 21,000 agents throughout the
158
The agents were otherwise wholesalers and
United States.
159
The Court examined a number of factors, including the
retailers.
fact that payment for the bulbs came only after they were resold and
that General Electric assumed some of the risks associated with the
160
Nevertheless, “agency”
lamps, including that of a price decline.
was defined broadly as the so-called “agents” bore most of the risks
161
There can be little doubt that the plan was
of ordinary resellers.
designed to produce the same results as RPM. But, since there was
no resale, the arrangement did not fall within the per se
162
prohibitions of Dr. Miles.
General Electric appeared to create a sizeable hole in Dr. Miles’s
prohibition of RPM. In 1964, in Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of
163
California, the Court revisited the issue and this time applied a

156. The plurality of actors is lost when a firm “agrees” with a related firm
like a subsidiary or parent. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 33, at 175–
80.
157. 272 U.S. 476 (1926); see generally Adams, supra note 91, at 985–87.
158. Gen. Elec., 272 U.S. at 478.
159. Id. at 483.
160. Id. at 484.
161. The agents were responsible for “all expenses in the storage, cartage,
transportation, handling, sale and distribution of lamps.” Id. at 482.
162. Id. at 486–88. Interestingly, General Electric had virtually total control
over the electric light market. This raises the question of whether the practice,
had it been held to involve agreements, could have even survived a rule of
reason analysis.
163. 377 U.S. 13 (1964). Between General Electric and Simpson, the Court
decided United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), which also dealt
with the use of so-called agents as a method of controlling price. In this
instance, however, the agents were fully independent firms who also sold the
same product in competition with the defendant. It was correctly characterized
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less formalistic approach. Union Oil supplied gasoline to service
stations that were designated as “agents.”
Simpson was an
“agent”/service station operator who was terminated for selling
164
Without overruling General
gasoline at below a designated price.
Electric, the Court found that the consignment agreement was a
165
The decision is not marked by a
form of fixing resale prices.
bright-line test for determining when the arrangement involves a
166
In fact, Union Oil
legitimate consignment and when it does not.
maintained title to the product as was the case in General Electric.
Critical to the case was the idea that a seller could retain ownership
but still constitute an entity separate from the party actually
making the sale, arguably on behalf of the owner. On the other
hand, the Court noted the importance of consignments in the
167
context of smaller-scale marketing efforts.
The Court noted a number of factors that pushed Union Oil’s
practice over the line. First, it referred to the limitations on
manufacturers created by Parke, Davis & Co. and observed that the
practice here went beyond a mere announcement and a refusal to
168
In addition, according to the
deal with those who did not comply.
169
Court, the consignment arrangement was on the increase with the
170
likelihood of “destroying competition in retail sales of gasoline.”
This particular observation is reminiscent of the warning issued
171
In addition, the Court indicated that the
more recently in Leegin.
vastness of the arrangement made it in substance, if not form,
172
Finally, the Court relied on the extent to which the service
RPM.
173
In this respect, it offered
station owners actually assumed risks.
this observation:
Dealers, like Simpson, are independent businessmen; and they
have all or most of the indicia of entrepreneurs, except for
price fixing. The risk of loss of the gasoline is on them, apart
from acts of God. Their return is affected by the rise and fall
in the market price, their commissions declining as retail
prices drop. Practically the only power they have to be wholly
independent businessmen, whose service depends on their own

as an elaborate effort to fix prices horizontally.
164. Simpson, 377 U.S. at 15.
165. See id. at 23–24.
166. See generally Albert C. Bender, Consignment Device for Retail Price
Maintenance Invalidated by Supreme Court, 17 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1965); The
Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 279, 279–82 (1964).
167. Simpson, 377 U.S. at 18.
168. Id. at 17.
169. Id. at 19.
170. Id. at 21.
171. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
893 (2007).
172. Simpson, 377 U.S. at 21–22.
173. See id. at 20.
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initiative and enterprise, is taken from them by the proviso
that they must sell their gasoline at prices fixed by Union
174
Oil.

The Court went on to distinguish General Electric in an
unconvincing fashion. It noted that General Electric, unlike the case
175
It discounted this as the
at hand, dealt with patented goods.
176
relevant distinction and concluded, rather cryptically, “whatever
may be said of the General Electric case on its special facts,
177
Nine
involving patents, it is not apposite to the special fact here.”
years after Simpson, the Justice Department once again challenged
General Electric’s “consignment” system. The court hearing the
case granted summary judgment in favor of the Justice Department
explaining, “it is plain that under Simpson price fixing is illegal per
se even when, as here, it is coupled with a consignment agency
system such as G.E.’s, involving agency agreements valid under
178
private contract law.”
General Electric and Simpson represent what we know about
179
the use of consignments and agents to control “resale” prices.
Obviously, now that RPM is assessed under the rule of reason, the
distinction is not as critical as it once was. Nevertheless, the task of
solving the puzzle of when an agent is to be regarded as an
instrument in an effort to control resale prices has been left to the
lower courts and for the most part they have followed the lead of the
Supreme Court in Simpson by focusing on the independence of the
180
resellers from their supplier.
Some years after Simpson, Judge Richard Posner attempted to
articulate a possibly more rational distinction between Simpson and
legitimate consignments. First, he aptly stated that the problem in
its bare bones is how “to reconcile Simpson with the proposition that
a homeowner does not violate . . . the Sherman Act when he tells his
181
Judge Posner’s answer is
broker at what price to sell his home.”
174. Id. at 20–21 (footnote call numbers omitted).
175. Id. at 23.
176. Id. at 22–23.
177. Id. at 23.
178. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 358 F. Supp. 731, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
179. This does not mean the status of these agreements is unambiguous.
See generally Terry Calvani & Andrew G. Berg, Resale Price Maintenance After
Monsanto: A Doctrine Still at War with Itself, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1163, 1177–81.
180. See, e.g., Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2005).
181. Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1436 (7th Cir. 1986).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals seems to have developed a very broad
version of how a manufacturer can avoid the per se standard through the use of
agents. One lower court in that circuit has interpreted Murray Biscuit reading
Simpson and a similar case as “narrow holdings prohibiting manufacturers
from merely labeling dealers and competitors as agents in order ‘to circumvent
the rule against price fixing.’” See Ill. Corp. Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
700 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (quoting Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d
at 1436). While the lower court quotes Murray Biscuit correctly, it is clear in
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to ask whether the consignment “has a function other than to
182
This particular
circumvent the rule against price fixing.”
observation seems to beg the question, and Judge Posner concedes,
183
However, an
that there is no clear distinction to be made.
important element in the analysis is to assess the number of
functions the agent provides.
This probably exists along a
continuum. If the agent carries no inventory and is but a conduit, it
is at one end of the continuum. On the other hand, if the so-called
agent has substantial overhead, assumes the risk of price increases
and decreases, and assumes responsibility for transportation,
delivery, and insurance, it can be seen at the opposite end of the
continuum. In those instances, according to Judge Posner, the
eventual price will be determined largely by the agent’s costs rather
than by the costs of the goods sold. In addition, the supplier will be
184
In this latter case, it is
less knowledgeable about those costs.
unrealistic to view the agent as merely a tool of the supplier, and
efforts to control the final price are more akin to conventional efforts
at RPM.
B.

The Post-Leegin Opportunity

To understand the possible impact of Leegin on the analysis, it
is useful to focus on what makes the consignment/agency
arrangement so difficult in the first place. In this respect it is
important to recall again the two questions posed by section 1 of the
Sherman Act: (1) Is there an agreement? (2) Is that agreement about
price? In the context of agency and consignment, the answer to the
185
first question is “yes” unless the agent is an actual employee.
And, the agreement is clearly designed to control the eventual price.
The problem that was the focus before Leegin was whether or not
there was a resale. If there was, the agreement was per se
unlawful. On the other hand, if a resale was not involved, there is
no reason, a priori, that the agreement could not still be
anticompetitive.
This focus on form sidetracked the analysis.
From the
standpoint of antitrust policy, once the agreement threshold has
been crossed the only relevant question is whether the effect of the
practice, however labeled, is pro- or anticompetitive. A finding that
it was or was not an actual consignment does not answer this
question. A close reading of Simpson reveals that the Court was
clearly on the right track by focusing on substance over form.
the lower court’s opinion that the “rule against” price fixing to which Judge
Posner was referring was the per se rule. See Ill. Corp. Travel, Inc. v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1986).
182. Murray Biscuit, 797 F.2d at 1436.
183. Id. at 1438.
184. See id. at 1438.
185. Another option is that the agent is the employee of a related firm.
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Whether the Court got the answer to the substantive question right
is, of course, an empirical question that courts of that era were not
particularly adept at answering. Still, the bottom-line analysis was
devoted to whether the net effect of the arrangement was to reduce
competition in the gasoline market.
The question now, of course, is whether Leegin alters the
consignment analysis. Obviously Leegin does not overturn General
Electric or Simpson and, at first glance, it may seem not to have any
impact at all. On the other hand, a closer look suggests that Leegin
may prove to be relevant. At the most obvious level it should make
the distinction between agent and reseller less important if not
irrelevant. Prior to Leegin, that distinction seemed to make the
186
difference between a rule of reason analysis and per se illegality.
Now, if applied correctly, as long as there is an agreement, whether
with a purported reseller or an independent agent, the only question
is the competitive impact. Of course if RPM now takes the path
taken by nonprice restraints after Sylvania, this may be the
equivalent of per se legality regardless of whether a consignment or
resale is involved.
The analysis can, however, be taken to another level. To
187
Sylvania
understand why, it is important to reconsider Sylvania.
was a direct response to the Court’s decision ten years earlier in
188
in which nonprice
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
vertical restraints were classified as per se unlawful. In making
that decision, however, the Court distinguished resale from
189
Nonprice vertical restraints involving resale were
consignments.
per se unlawful; those involving the use of agents and consignment
190
Not only did
were to be assessed under the rule of reason.
Sylvania shift nonprice vertical restraints to the rule of reason
191
It
analysis, it abolished this resale/consignment distinction.
reasoned that the Schwinn Court had provided “no analytical
192
support for [the] contrasting positions.”
When it comes to the agency/resale issue, there is an obvious
parallel between vertical nonprice restraints and vertical price
restraints. Sylvania, in the course of making nonprice restraints
186. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379–81
(1967). Of course, Schwinn was overruled by Sylvania but only with respect to
the per se treatment of nonprice restraints. See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1977). Thus, the agency/resale distinction
even up until Leegin should have been relevant only with respect to whether
the practice was assessed under the rule of reason or the per se standard.
Nevertheless, a rule of reason standard, when applied to vertical restraints,
seems to work much like a standard of per se legality.
187. See supra notes 28–34 and accompanying text.
188. 388 U.S. 365.
189. Id. at 378–80.
190. Id. at 379–80.
191. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54, 57–59.
192. Id. at 54.
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subject to the rule of reason, indicated that consignment sales and
193
Properly
true resales would be treated under the same standard.
understood, Leegin can play the same role in the context of RPM.
Prior to Leegin, RPM was per se unlawful while the actual analysis
of Simpson in many respects mirrors a rule of reason analysis. In
other words, what was nominally a determination of when actual
agents were used, as opposed to when sham agents were involved,
had a strong substantive element. One inference from this is that
the formalistic step of defining whether one is an agent or not is no
194
longer relevant.
What this means is that Leegin provides an opportunity to
simplify the consignment issue by allowing a court to move directly
to the issue of competitive impact once an agreement has been
established. As long as independent business entities are involved,
the issues of price and sham agencies become irrelevant. There is
195
The overarching question would
little downside risk in doing this.
remain whether the arrangement has an undesirable effect. If it
does, the use of a formalistic distinction between consignment and
nonconsignment hardly advances antitrust policy.
And the
necessity of using or the temptation to use sham agents would seem
to decline. Prior to Leegin, a firm concerned that its efforts to
control downstream prices would be per se unlawful might conceal
its objectives by the use of agents. Even after Simpson, there was
some probability of gaining a strategic advantage by doing so. After
Leegin, however, any agreement automatically goes to a rule of
reason analysis and an entire mistake-prone step of classification is
eliminated.
One post-Leegin case addressed the issue, albeit somewhat
indirectly, and it missed the opportunity to make use of this more
streamlined approach. In Valuepest.com of Charlotte, Inc. v. Bayer
196
Corp., the plaintiffs were providers of pest-control services who
197
At some point, Bayer, the
purchased pesticides from distributors.
manufacturer, decided to sell through “agents” who did not take title
198
To do this it did not engage a team of new
to the pesticides.
199
The
agents but designated its former distributors as “agents.”
allegation was that the manufacturers of the pesticides had
conspired with the distributors to fix the resale price of the

193. Id.
194. This is, however, a different question from whether the agent is an
employee of the firm or of a subsidiary.
195. In this context a downside risk would be one of condemning an
arrangement that is not actually anticompetitive.
196. 561 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2009).
197. Id. at 284–85.
198. Id. at 285.
199. Bayer evidently switched back to the use of distributors as resellers in
2005. Id.
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200

pesticides.
The defendants relied on General Electric for the
proposition that, in effect, there was no resale because the
201
Interestingly, the plaintiffs
distributors were merely agents.
202
claimed that Leegin had implicitly overruled General Electric.
The Valuepest court began its analysis by noting that “General
Electric addressed what types of relationships constitute agreements
203
It also concluded
to set prices for purposes of the Sherman Act.”
that “Leegin has no bearing on the continued validity of General
204
While correct that Leegin did not overrule General
Electric.”
Electric (or at least what was left of General Electric after Simpson
and Sylvania), the court’s characterizations are a bit simplistic and
205
This can be understood by noting that
actually obfuscate matters.
General Electric is more accurately characterized as a case
determining when resale prices have been fixed. It is not necessary
or appropriate to read General Electric as saying that any
agreement that has an impact on prices is legal simply because it
escapes the per se condemnation of RPM. In any case, having read
too much into General Electric and ignoring the opportunity Leegin
presented, the Valuepest court moved to the conventional formalistic
analysis of whether the distributors could fairly be regarded as
agents and thereby immunize both manufacturers and, apparently,
206
In fact, after Leegin, this question
the distributors themselves.
seems irrelevant.
Rather than the formalistic analysis, what Leegin allows is a
more direct and substantive analysis. It is clear that the parties in
Valuepest were sufficiently separate to create the plurality of parties
to establish the existence of an agreement. There is no indication
that the distributors, however classified, were employees of the
manufacturer or partially or wholly owned by the manufacturers or
subsidiaries of the same parent. In fact, as already noted, these
“agents” were former distributors who had bought and resold
pesticides, including those of the defendants. An understanding
between separate entities involving no resale but setting a selling
price is still an agreement. Having established the agreement, the
next step in a section 1 Sherman Act analysis is whether it creates
200. Id. at 284.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 286.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 288.
205. The court also misinterprets the rule of patents in the General
Electric/Simpson doctrine. According to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Simpson distinguished General Electric on the basis of the fact that the General
Electric products involved patents. Id. at 289. In fact, the General Electric
Court, as the Simpson Court correctly noted, indicated that its holding did not
depend on whether the articles involved were patented. Simpson v. Union Oil
Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 23 (1964) (citing United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272
U.S. 476, 488 (1926)).
206. Valuepest.com., 561 F.3d at 288–94.
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an unreasonable restraint on trade—whether it is classified as a
price restraint or nonprice restraint or anything in between that is,
in fact, where an independent firm acting as an agent may fall.
Ironically, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs, by claiming that Leegin
overruled General Electric, had “conflate[d] the distinction between
the two elements required to prove liability under § 1” of the
207
This may be true and, again, the court is obviously
Sherman Act.
correct that General Electric was not overruled by Leegin.
208
Nevertheless, the court was also guilty of conflating the issues.
The fact that two separate parties agree on the way in which a
product will be marketed, but are not involved in a resale, does not
mean the two requirements of section 1 are not met. Moreover, it
seemed to miss the historical significance of General Electric and
Simpson. At the core of those cases was an effort to protect from per
se antitrust condemnation a type of distribution that could
frequently be pro-competitive. Now the danger of erroneous per se
condemnation is unnecessary as is reliance on formalistic solutions
209
to the problem of “false positives.”
To some extent the danger of not recognizing that agents can be
separate entities for section 1 purposes is exemplified by the
Valuepest court’s analysis. In this respect, it is important to note
that the very same entities that were buying and reselling pesticide
at one point were quickly switched to the status of agents. At that
point it is hard to understand why the court searched any further to
determine the independence of the agents.
CONCLUSION
To a significant degree, Leegin dots the “i” of the Supreme
Court’s revision of the application of the antitrust laws to vertical
210
In the wake of Leegin, what is left unclear is the status
restraints.
of the cases the Court decided during the hundred-year reign of Dr.
Miles that initially had the effect of strengthening and then
weakening the per se rule. Many of these cases involved formalistic
line drawing done in service to the Court’s view of the wisdom of Dr.
207. Id. at 288.
208. To some extent, the problem is the assumption that an agent by
definition cannot form a contract for section 1 purposes. For example, in a 1964
article the authors write: “Because the retailer does not have title in the goods
and sells them as an agent for the manufacturer, there can be no conspiracy.”
Calvani & Berg, supra note 179, at 1178. The authors do not appear to state,
however, that this is the law. Instead, their conclusion is offered as the
reasoning with which one would support the legality of agency agreements.
209. In other words, the danger of prohibiting pro-competitive practices.
210. In the context of horizontal restraints, the process of revision is
somewhat behind. It appears to be only a matter of time before the Court
announces new directions in the context of the so-called per se rule against
tying and the per se status of territorial divisions.
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Miles. Now those cases are obsolete with respect to their service of
the goal of avoiding antitrust errors and could subtract from the
promise of a more substantive approach.
One of the series of cases analyzed here focused on the issue of
when there was an agreement to fix prices and drew the line
initially at any effort that went further than announcing price and
not selling to those who did not adhere to that price. In reality, all
of these arrangements could have been viewed as contracts under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, but the emphasis on form over
substance meant never reaching the issue of possible
anticompetitive effects. After Sylvania, this focus on the concept of
agreement continued as the Court wrestled with the problem that
price restraints and nonprice restraints were assessed under two
different standards. In order to ensure a rule of reason approach to
nonprice restraints, the Court very narrowly defined what
constituted an agreement on price.
Another series of cases concerns whether a product is involved
in a resale or is sold a single time under a consignment agreement.
This distinction also meant that the analysis veered from a
211
substantive evaluation to questions of whether a resale took place.
The focus was entirely without economic content and concerned a
refined yet formalistic analysis of what it means for a party to be an
agent.
Leegin creates an opportunity to move the analysis to a more
economically meaningful level that avoids the risks associated with
the more formalistic approaches. Under the pre-Leegin approach,
almost certainly anticompetitive arrangements persisted because
they were classified as not involving agreements.
Similarly,
especially under the per se standard, arrangements without
negative competitive effects were condemned. Leegin eliminates
those types of errors. A broad interpretation of what constitutes an
agreement does not create a risk of an ultimately incorrect decision.
In order to reach this goal, it needs to be understood that Dr. Miles’s
orphans no longer serve the purpose they once did, and that
continuing to follow their analysis squanders the opportunity that
Leegin offers.

211. In other words, were the parties employers and employees or separate
entities?

